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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the Census Bureau reported that of the twenty million 
children, under the age of five, living in the United States, 50.2% 
were minorities.1 For those who feared that White Americans would 
soon become the minority, recent data reveals that the day has al-
ready come, and by 2020, more than half of America's children under 
the age of eighteen will be members of a racial minority or ethnic 
group.2 However, despite the country's increasing racial diversity, 
our society's preference for Eurocentric standards ofbeauty remains 
the same.3 
"Eurocentric'' standards of beauty refer to the bias shown to-
wards European or Caucasian culture and the physical traits associ-
ated with it.4 Furthermore, as the United States is seen as one of 
the most powerful countries in the world, our standard of beauty 
has seeped into other countries as a result of globalization, influenc-
ing the way other cultures define beauty.5 For example, preference 
1. Noor Wazwaz, It's OfficiaL· The U.S. is Becoming a Minority-Majority Nation, 
U.S. NEWS (JulyS, 2015, 5:14PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/06/its 
·offi.cial-the-us-is-becoming-a-minority-majority-nation [https://penna.cc/8NKZ-Z57M]. 
2. Id. 
3. See Franchesca Ramsey, Here's the Major Problem with White Beauty Standards, 
EVERYDAY FE:MINISM (July 17, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com/20 16/07/white-beauty 
-standards [https://perma.cc/BN4Z-WTD5]. 
4. Gabriella Tranchina, Eurocentric Beauty Standards: A Global Disease, GERM 
MAG. (June 15, 2015), http:/lwww.germmagazine.com/eurocentric-beauty-standards-a 
-global-disease [https://perma.cc/F4BS-NRKP]. 
5. ld. 
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for lighter skin remains prevalent in Asian culture.6 Historically, fair 
skin was considered a symbol of wealth, separating upper-class indi-
viduals from the working class who typically labored outdoors and 
had darker skin.7 Today, in certain parts of Asia, many women use 
skin-whitening creams and avoid walking outside in the sun to keep 
their skin as close to white as possible.8 Double eyelid surgery has 
also become a popular practice in some Asian countries for people 
who want to change their epicanthic fold, a trait common to Asians, 
to be in conformity with Eurocentric standards ofbeauty.9 
The issue with using whiteness as a yardstick for measuring 
one's beauty is that it reinforces a system of white supremacy. 10 Based 
on this standard, White people, by definition, are the most attrac-
tive, and anyone who deviates from it is considered less attractive or 
ugly.11 The popular saying, ''beauty is in the eye of the beholder," 
implies that the concept of beauty is entirely subjective. 12 In our 
culture, the beholder is the media, advertising companies, and the 
fashion and beauty industries, whose opinions and representations 
ofbeauty our society has, by and large, adopted.13 
For instance, white standards ofbeauty are visible in the enter-
tainment industry, where most of the women who appear in major 
Hollywood films are exclusively White.14 Moreover, the range of Black 
representation on the big screen is so limited that someone who has 
never stepped foot in the United States could reasonably assume 
that the vast majority of Black women in America are light skinned, 
which is obviously untrue.15 Likewise, the fashion industry lacks 
6. Roger Pe, Yes, Asia is Obsessed with White Skin, INQUIRER.NET (Oct. 1, 2016, 5:25 
AM), http:/lbusiness.inquirer.net/215898/yes-asia-is-obsessed-with-white-sk:in [https:/1 
perma.cc!QQ2E-592V]. 
7. Id. 
8. Tranchina, supra note 4. 
9 . Id. 
10. Lisa Wade, When Whiteness is the Standard of Beauty, Soc'YPAGES (May 16, 2014), 
https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2014/05/16/white-as-beautiful-black-as-white 
[https://perma.cc/8CK4-JTJL]. 
11. Id. 
12. Elizabeth Aura McClintock, Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder?, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(Mar. 19, 20 14), https://www.psychologytoday.com/uslblog/it-s-man-s-and-woman-s-world 
/201403/is-beauty-in-the-eye-the-beholder [https://perma.cc/CX4J-39J7]. 
13. Maisha Z. Johnson, 10 Ways the Beauty Industry Tells You Being Beautiful 
Means Being White, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Jan. 3, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com 
/2016/0 1/when-beauty-equals-white [https://perma.cc/H4C9-5FKB]. 
14. See id.; see also Patrick Ryan, #OscarsSoWhite controversy: What you need to 
know, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2016, 9:22AM), https:/lwww.usatoday.com/storyllife/movies 
/2016/02/02/oscars-academy-award-nominations-diversity/79645542 [https://perma.cc 
/N44Y-W9EG]. 
15. Tiffany Onyejiaka, Hollywood's Colorism Problem Can't Be Ignored Any Longer, 
TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 22, 2017, 1:34PM), https:/lwww.teenvogue.com/story/hollywoods-col 
orism-problem-cant-be-ignored [https://perma.cc/6K7M-SFUC]. 
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racial diversity.16 In 2014,82.7% of the models in New York's Fash-
ion Week-arguably the world's biggest fashion event-were White.17 
Women of color are also under-represented in most product and 
commercial advertisements, even when the product being marketed 
is intended for a minority audience.18 
In addition to valuing whiteness, Eurocentric standards ofbeauty 
normalize having long, straight hair.19 In his Note on the State of 
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson mentions "flowing hair," in addition to, 
"a more elegant symmetry of form" when describing the superior 
beauty ofWhites while relegating Black people to orangutans.20 And 
while there is nothing wrong with fitting the norm, the consequences 
suffered by women who do not are damaging, specifically for women 
of color.21 Black women are especially vulnerable to the effects of 
Eurocentric beauty standards because these standards emphasize 
skin tones and hair types that exclude most Black women.22 
Most recently, Amara La Negra, an Afro-Latina cast member on 
VHl's Love & Hip Hop Miami, made headlines after shutting down 
music producer Young Hollywood, after he insulted her natural hair, 
insinuating that it would keep her from succeeding as an artist be-
cause Mros are not "elegant'' or "breathtaking ."23 Young Hollywood's 
comments highlight only some of the common stereotypes and micro-
aggressions Black women endure as a result of choosing to wear 
their hair naturally. He mockingly called her "soul sista" and "Nutella 
queen," causing her to walk out of the studio.24 Later, in her confes-
sional, the singer said in response to his comments, "I don't want to 
16. Alexandra Steigrad, Naomi Campbell Blasts Fashion Industry for Lack of 
Diversity (Again), WoMEN'S WEAR DAILY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://wwd.com/business-news 
/media/naomi-ca.mpbell-blasts-fashion-industry-for-lack-of-diversity-again-10781335-107 
81335 [https://perma.cc/Q7UX-UGWY]. 
17. Johnson, supra note 13. 
18. See id.; Lisa Marie Segarra, SheaMoistureApologizes for, Pulls Controversial Ad: 
'We Really F--ked This One Up', PEOPLE (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://people.com 
/style/shea-moisture-pulls-controversial-ad [https://perma.cc/HB8T-PFKE]. 
19. Imani Gandy, Black Hair Discrimination Is Real-But Is It Against the Law?, 
REWIRE.NEWS (Apr. 17, 2017, 4:58PM), https://rewire.news/ablc/2017/04/17/black-hair 
-discrimination-real-but-is-it-against-law/ [https://perma.cc/26K6-MJKR]. 
20. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIV (1787). 
21. Susan L. Bryant, The Beauty Ideal: The Effects of European Standards of Beauty 
on Black Women, 4 COLUM. Soc. WoRK REv. 80, 80 (2013). 
22. Id. 
23. See Moriba Cummings, Twitter Drags Young Hollywood to Hell for Racist Com-
ments Against Amara La Negra in 'L&HH Miami' Premiere, BET (Jan. 2, 2018), https:// 
www .bet.com/celebrities/news/20 1810 1/02/love-hip-hop-miami.html [https://perma.cc/5H 
UF-WL9Y]; see also Cheky, Amara La Negra Responds to Blackface Rumors After 'Love 
& Hip-Hop' Premiere (Jan. 5, 2018, 3:14PM), http://remezcla.com/musidamara-la-negra 
-love-and-hip-hop-blackface-rumors [https://perma.cc/J3A5-2CWY]. 
24. Cummings, supra note 23. 
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fit 'the box,' I want to be Amara La Negra, and I'm not going to change 
that for anybody else."25 
Likewise, in light of the recent "explosion" of the natural hair 
movement, some Black women have decided to quit using chemical 
relaxers, and are learning to love and embrace their hair in its 
natural state.26 Others remain on the fence in the natural versus 
straightened-hair debate, as the wrong decision can cost them their 
jobs.27 In the professional world, employers, by enforcing "workplace 
grooming policies," get to make that decision for them. 28 These policies 
allow employers to regulate employees' dress and appearance in order 
to maintain a "professionaf' image within the company.29 
Generally, the courts will respect an employer's grooming poli-
cies, so long as they serve legitimate business purposes and do not 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or sex.30 However, in 
2016, the Eleventh Circuit upheld an employer's ban on dreadlocks-
a hairstyle commonly associated with Black heritage.31 In the con-
text of employment law, Congress has limited the definition of race 
under Title VII to "immutable traits" of a person's race, excluding 
cultural aspects associated with race. 32 This narrow interpretation 
has left the courts to grapple with the question of what qualifies as 
"race discrimination'' in employment cases, with the courts tending 
to rule in favor of the employer. 33 Furthermore, the distinction made 
between "immutable" biological traits and cultural aspects associated 
with race, allows employers to discriminate based on an individual's 
expression of their cultural identity. 34 
25. Id. 
26. Natural hairstyles refer to when Black women style their hair in a way that is 
consistent with the hair's natural texture. Gandy, supra note 19. 
27. Emma Axelrod, The Effect of "Beauty" Standards in Professional America, BROWN 
PoL. REV. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www .brownpoliticalreview .org/20 14/111the-effect-of-beauty 
-standards-in-professional-america [https://perma.cc/6XTB-BCNF]. 
28. ld. 
29. Sheppard Mullin, Dress and Grooming Policies in the Workplace, SHEPPARD 
MULLIN LAB. & E:MP. L. BLOG (May 15, 2009), https:/lwww.laboremploymentlawblog.com 
/2009/05/articleslhiring-discipline-terminationldress-and-grooming-policies-in-the-work 
place [https://perma.cc/4YX9-3U2Q]. 
30. Emily Jane Perkins, Regulating Appearance in the Workplace: An Employer's 
Guide To Avoid Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https:l/www .natlawreview .com/article/regulating-appearance-workplace-employer-s 
-guide-to-avoid-employment-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8DB6-NFWT]. 
31. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2016). 
32. Lisa E. Kaplan & Samantha K. Smith, Grooming Policies in the Workplace: 11th 
Circuit Upholds Employer's Dreadlock Ban, USA (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.lexology 
.comllibrary/detail.aspx?F55d48d8a-dce6-4981-81c0-004 70b99a20a [https:l/perma.cdPX 
W5-XNSF]. 
33. See Perkins, supra note 30. 
34. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32. 
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This Note will consider the courts' current conceptualization of 
race, and explain why the immutability requirement, as it applies 
to protected classes under Title VII, should be abandoned or applied 
less stringently. This Note will discuss the purpose, provisions, and 
exclusions of Title VII and address some of its inadequacies. The 
Note will further analyze the existing case law related to workplace 
grooming policies that ban certain hairstyles, and discuss possible 
precedent for broadening the category of race to include ethnic hair-
styles. And lastly, this Note concludes with some plausible recom-
mendations for amending the law. 
I. THERE'S NOTHING DREADFUL ABOUT MY LOCKS 
In 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
filed a lawsuit against Catastrophe Management Solutions (CMS) 
on behalf of Plaintiff Chastity Jones, a Black woman, whose job offer 
was rescinded after she declined to cut off her dreadlocks. 35 The 
EEOC argued that by rescinding Jones's offer pursuant to its groom-
ing policy, CMS violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
the practice ofbanning dreadlocks, 36 a hairstyle "physiologically and 
culturally associated with people of African descent," in the work-
place, constitutes racial discrimination.37 CMS's policy read: "[a]ll 
personnel are expected to be dressed and groomed in a manner that 
projects a professional and businesslike image while adhering to 
company and industry standards and/or guidelines .... [H]airstyle 
should reflect a business/professional image. No excessive hairstyles 
or unusual [hairstyles] are acceptable[.]"38 
The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failing to plausibly 
state a claim of intentional discrimination based on race. 39 Subse-
quently, in its amended complaint that went before the Eleventh 
Circuit, the EEOC made four new arguments to defend its position 
that having dreadlocks was a racial characteristic for purposes of 
Title VII.40 First, it rejected the court's biological definition of race 
and asserted that race was a social construct. 41 Second, it argued 
that the concept of race was not "limited to or defined by immutable 
35. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 2016). 
36. Dreadlocks ('locks'') consist of sections of hair that are permanently locked 
together and cannot be unlocked without cutting. 
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(m) (1964); see also Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 
852 F.3d at 1023. 
38. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022. 
39. Id. at 1020. 
40. Id. at 1022. 
41. Id. 
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physical characteristics."42 Third, the EEOC referred to its own man-
ual and explained that race encompassed "cultural characteristics 
related to race or ethnicity, including 'grooming practices.' "43 Lastly, 
the EEOC likened dreadlocks to skin color, a characteristic of race. 44 
After addressing the race point, the EEOC indicated that it 
intended to proceed under a disparate treatment theory, alleging 
that CMS intentionally discriminated against Jones on the basis of 
race.45 However, in the view ofthe court, this is where the EEOC 
misstepped.46 While claiming to bring their suit under a disparate 
treatment theory, the EEOC made disparate impact arguments 
instead. 47 They argued that "the people most adversely ... affected 
by a dreadlocks ban, such as CMS'[s] [policy], are African-Americans," 
and because this was a disparate treatment case, the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to address the EEOC's arguments that CMS's policy had a 
disproportionate effect on Black employees. 48 IDtimately, because the 
EEOC conflated two very similar, but legally distinct theories of 
liability, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.49 
II. STRANDS OF TITLE VII 
Nearly fifty years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 
comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964 in response to the long-
standing history of segregation and discrimination in the United 
States-which denied certain groups access and opportunities for 
decades. 5° From this legislation, Title VII was created specifically to 
ensure equal opportunity in America's workplaces and to provide a 
federal remedy for those discriminated against on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin.61 The law also created the EEOC.62 
The law generally prohibits employers from using a person's race, 
sex, religion, or national origin to make hiring decisions, grant or 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. CatastropheMgmt. Sols. , 852 F.3d at 1022. 
45. Id. at 1024. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (citation omitted). 
49. See Gandy, supra note 19. 
50. Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement on 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, EEOC (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoclhistory/cra50thlindex.cfm [https:/1 
perma.cci56PZ-6EHK]. 
51. See id.; Know Your Rights: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AAUW, https:// 
www.aauw.org/what-we-dollegal-resourcesfkn.ow-your-rights-at-workltitle-vii [https://perma 
.cc/X8RZ-XVU8]. 
52. Dawn Rosenberg McKay, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, BALANCE CA-
REERS (Apr. 7, 20 17), https:/lwww. thebalance.com/title-vii-of-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964 
-525697 [https://perma.cci7H9V-LCCW]. 
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deny promotions, or determine a person's pay or benefits. 53 Further, 
Title VII protection extends to both employees and job applicants.64 
Despite the passing of this law, discrimination based on race 
and gender in the workplace remains a serious problem. 55 In 2016, 
the EEOC received a total of91,503 complaints, and more than half 
of the claims were related to both race and sex discrimination. 56 
A. The Immutability Requirement 
With the passing of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (GINA)57 and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment 
Act (ADAAA), 58 Congress has added genetic information and disabil-
ity to the list of characteristics employers cannot consider under 
Title VII. 59 In light of these recent developments in the law, it begs 
the question of why other characteristics are excluded from Title 
VII's statutory scheme, namely, cultural aspects related to race and 
other traits fundamental to one's identity.60 
While the concept of immutability provides a unifying principle 
for all traits covered by Title VII, it fails to address more elusive 
forms of discrimination that the law does not account for. 61 For 
example, under current law, it is perfectly legal for an employer to 
consider an applicant's appearance when making hiring decisions.62 
Employers recognize that attractiveness sells and that appearance 
affects perceived characteristics such as intelligence, motivation, 
wealth, and overall capability.63 Furthermore, psychological studies 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Seeid. 
56. U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMM'N, Charge Statistics (Charges filed with 
EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, https://www.eeoc.govl/eeoclstatistics/enforcement 
/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/YTW 4-6QAU]. 
57. Under Title II of GINA, it is illegal to discriminate against employees or applicants 
because of genetic information. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 2000ff (2008). Under this law, employers may not use genetic information in making em-
ployment decisions or request genetic information or test results as a condition of 
employment. Id. 
58. The ADAAA emphasizes that the definition of disability should be construed in 
favor of broad coverage of individuals to the maximum extent allowed by the ADA and 
generally should not require extensive analysis. ADA Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 (2008). 
59. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2011). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Ritu Mahajan, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Employment, and 
the Law, 14 AsiAN AM. L.J. 165, 165 (2007). 
63. Perkins, supra note 30. 
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have proven this very phenomenon of associating physical attrac-
tiveness with success. 64 
A famous and historic illustration of this phenomenon was the 
nation's first televised presidential debate between Richard Nixon 
and John F. Kennedy in 1960.65 Viewers who watched the debate on 
television saw Nixon who appeared pale, sickly, and underweight 
from a recent hospitalization in comparison to Kennedy, who looked 
calm, confident, and reportedly had been tanning the day before. 66 
Those who only listened to the debate on the radio thought Nixon was 
the winner. 67 However, by 1960, eighty-eight percent of Americans 
had televisions and believed that Kennedy won the debate. 68 
Some argue that employers have a legitimate business interest 
in employee appearance, and it should be no surprise that employ-
ers are more likely to hire physically attractive individuals and 
exclude applicants who do not appear to fit in. 69 Hence, in theory, an 
employer could choose not to hire someone because she is over-
weight, does not wear makeup, or is simply "less attractive."70 
As discussed earlier, our society privileges whiteness as the 
standard of beauty, and those who do not meet that standard are 
perceived unfavorably.71 Furthermore, these biases related to ap-
pearance can impact social interactions, including one's ability to 
gain employment.72 Thus, a woman like Chastity Jones-who has 
dreadlocks-may be perceived as lazy, incompetent, or less produc-
tive simply because she does not meet societal expectations of what 
is acceptable appearance or beauty. 73 What makes appearance-based 
racial discrimination difficult to detect is that it is not "explicitly 
coded."74 Instead, policies that target ethnic hairstyles are rooted in 
people's attitudes, and frankly, misconceptions about black hair.75 
64. Ray Williams, "I'm Successful Because I'm Beautiful"-How We Discriminate, 
LINKEDIN (June 27, 2014), https:/lwww.linkedin.com/pulse/20140627135441-1011572--i 
-m-successful-because-i-m-beautiful-how-we-discriminate [https://perma.cc/W24B-KTTQ]. 
65. See Kayla Webley, How the Nixon-&nnedy Debate Changed the World, TIME 
(Sept. 23, 20 10), http://oontent. time.oomltime/nation/article/0,8599 ,2021078,00.html [https:// 
perma.cdK6U9-X9JS]. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See Williams, supra note 64. 
70. Seeid. 
71. See Ramsey, supra note 3. 
72. See Mahajan, supra note 62, at 165. 
73. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgm.t. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Mahajan, supra note 62, at 165. 
74. Axelrod, supra note 27. 
75. See HloniphaMokoena, From Slavery to Colonialism and School Rules: A History 
of Myths About Black Hair, CONVERSATION (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:55 AM), http://theconversa 
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Natural hairstyles like Afros have historically been tied to radi-
cal political movements and leaders like Angela Davis and the Black 
Panthers.76 But wearing one's hair naturally has little to do with 
politics. It is simply wearing one's hair how it naturally grows on 
one's head. Specific to dreadlocks, the most enduring stereotype 
about black natural hair is that it is dirty.77 Urban legend has it 
that Bob Marley had forty-seven different strands of lice in his 
dreadlocks when he died. 78 These types of speculations are problem-
atic because they perpetuate harmful stereotypes about black hair 
that are often inaccurate.79 
Another stereotype is that Afros and dreadlocks are the results of 
unwashed, or "unkept" hair. 80 On the contrary, dreadlocks, like Afros, 
are the result of natural hair growth and require extensive mainte-
nance. 81 Like any haircare routine, washing one's hair on a regular 
basis is essential to keeping the hair neat and clean.82 Water also 
helps "lock" the hair as it naturally kinks the hair, resulting in a 
stronger hold. 83 Lockticians84 also recommend using natural oils and 
hair butters to retain moisture and condition the hair to prevent 
dryness. 85 Furthermore, as the hair continues to grow, there are sev-
eral methods one can use to incorporate new growth into existing 
hair strands, including palm rolling, dread balling, and crocheting.86 
It is unlikely that when Congress first passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 it considered bans on ethnic hairstyles a form of racial 
discrimination.87 But as proven with the creation of GINA and the 
ADAAA, Title VII can be expanded to reach injustices not contem-
plated in 1964.88 
tion.com/from-slavery-to-colonialism-and-school-rules-a-history-of-myths-about-black 
-hair-64676 [https://perma.cciG54H-RK44]. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Ariane, 4 Tips for Dreadlock Care, BLACK NAPS (Jan. 10, 2013), https://blacknaps 
.org/20 13/01110/4-tips-for-dreadlock-care [https://perma.cci5F7K-V57 J]. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. A locktician is a hairstylist who specializes in dreadlocks. See Jeffrey Bradley, 
Locticians Help You Grow Great Dreadlocks, STREETDIRECTORY, https:/lwww.streetdirec 
tory.com/travel_guide/42992/beauty_tips/locticians_help_you_grow_great_dreadlocks. 
html [https://perma.cci228N-RQQJ]. 
85. DreadlockMaintencmce, BLACK WOMEN BEAUTY CENT., https:/!www.black-women 
-beauty-central.com/dreadlock-maintenance.html [https://perma.cciKB3D-L YRY] . 
86. How to maintain the perfect Dreadlocks, DREAD SHOP, http://www .dreadlocks.com 
. a u/en/content/1 0-dreadlocks-maintenance-guide-step-by -step-instructions-and-faqs 
[https://perma.cci8GGN-PTWG]. 
87. Gandy, supra note 19. 
88. Id. 
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The courts' current conceptualization of race under Title VII 
leave Black women, who stand at the intersection of race and 
gender, the most vulnerable to discriminatory practices like banning 
quintessentially black hairstyles.89 Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, 
prominent civil rights advocate and critical race theorist, introduced 
the term "intersectionality'' as a way of framing social justice issues, 
particularly those that affect Black women.90 The term in its name 
recognizes the overlapping and intersecting systems of injustice 
certain communities face, instead of categorizing things independ-
ently as a race, gender, or class issue as that approach fails to 
capture the experience of individuals who are subject to injustice 
vis-a-vis all these identities at once.91 Quite oppositely, the courts do 
not recognize intersectional claims of discrimination. 92 
In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, five Black female plaintiffs 
sued General Motors for employment discrimination, alleging that 
the company's "last hired-first fired" seniority system perpetuated 
the effects of past discrimination against Black women.93 Evidence 
presented at trial "revealed that General Motors simply did not hire 
Black women prior to 1964 and that all the Black women hired after 
1970 lost their jobs in a seniority-based layoff [following] a subse-
quent recession."94 In that case, the district court held that "black 
women" were not a special class under Title VII and that they could 
only sue on the separate bases of race or sex discrimination, not 
both.96 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs "should not be allowed 
to combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which 
would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant 
statutes intended."96 Additionally, the court concluded that ''because 
General Motors did hire women-albeit white women-during the 
period that no Black women were hired," the seniority system could 
not have possibly perpetuated any sort of sex discrimination. 97 
89. Kimberle Crenshaw on Intersectionality, More than Two Decades Later, COLUM. 
L. SCH. (June 8, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/2017/06/kimberle-crenshaw 
-intersectionality [https://perma.cd6TG8-RP7 A]. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, andAntiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141 (1989). 
93. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
94. Crenshaw, supra note 92, at 141. 
95. Id. at 142. 
96. Id. at 141. 
97. Id. at 142. 
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Following the DeGraffenreid court's logic, Black women are 
protected only to the extent their experiences fit neatly into either 
of the two classes protected by the law. 98 In practice, this view favors 
the most privileged covered by Title VII's statutory scheme, specifi-
cally White women and Black men, while marginalizing Black 
women, who are burdened by and subjected to more nuanced forms 
of discrimination.99 This reality demands the need to change the 
way courts understand race generally, in order to afford greater 
protections for certain subclasses within minority groups. 
In EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Title VII protection only extends to immutable 
traits of race and that mutable characteristics such as hairstyles, 
even if culturally associated with a protected class, are not protected 
characteristics. 100 However, Chastity Jones is not the first plaintiff 
to sue her employer for banning her hairstyle.101 In 1981, Renee 
Rogers, a flight attendant, sued American Airlines for its grooming 
policy that prohibited employees from wearing cornrows. 102 She 
argued that the policy violated her right under Title VII among other 
things, and discriminated against her as a Black woman.103 
The district court disagreed and held that a neutral employer 
policy against women wearing cornrows104 was not a race-based 
distinction, and that such a policy would only violate Title VII if it 
had a disparate impact on Black women and was not consistent with 
a job-related or business necessity.105 The court went on further to 
say that if the policy banned Mro hairstyles, then it would be a race-
based distinction and closer to a violation of Title VII, as Afros are 
a result of natural hair growth, not artifice.106 In the court's opinion, 
an all-braided hairstyle is an "easily changed characteristic'' and can-
not be the basis of a discrimination claim.107 To add insult to injury, 
the court attributed a hairstyle that has been culturally and histori-
cally worn by Black people to a White woman, by suggesting that 
the plaintiff only chose to wear her hair in braids after the actress 
98. Id. 
99. Seeid. 
100. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32. 
101. Axelrod, supra note 27. 
102. Id. 
103. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
104. Cornrows are a type ofbraided hairstyle, where the hair is braided onto the scalp 
in rows, usually braided all the way down to the nape of the neck. See Cornrow, MER-
RIAM WEBSTER, https:/lwww.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comrow [https://perma.cc 
IRKL3-A YRC]. 
105. Gandy, supra note 19. 
106. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
107. Id. 
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Bo Derek "popularized," but really culturally appropriated, the hair-
style in the film 10. 108 
The court's determination that American Airlines's policy did not 
exclusively target Black women, but applied evenly to anyone who 
might want to wear his or her hair this way, fails to consider the 
cultural significance or practical reasons why Black women choose 
certain hairstyles, illuminating the federal judiciary's overwhelming 
whiteness and lack of cultural competency. 109 While to some hair 
may seem trivial, the issue ofblack hair is anything but trivial.110 
During the late 18th Century, "tignon laws" required Black and 
Creole women in Louisiana to wear head scarves because they wore 
their hair "in such elaborate ways that it attracted the attention of 
[W]hite men."m These laws were not only to keep Black women out 
ofthe White male gaze, but to mitigate White women's jealousy, as 
it was common for White men to openly keep Black women as their 
mistresses.112 Thus, very early in American history, Black women's 
natural hair was an issue of law and a matter of contention. 113 
Market research revealed that in 2012, the black haircare market 
was valued at $684 million with a projection of $761 million by 
2017.114 When taking into account general market brands, weaves, 
extensions, wigs, independent beauty supply stores, distributors, e-
commerce, styling tools, and appliances, the industry is worth ap-
proximately $500 billion-in other words, half a trillion dollars. 115 
It should come as no surprise that Black women spend a significant 
amount of money on haircare given the persistent intolerance and 
bias surrounding natural hair in the workplace. 116 
Workplace grooming policies generally require that an employee's 
hair is groomed in a manner that is professional, businesslike, not "too 
excessive," or unconventional. 117Moreover, since these policies track 
108. See id.; see also Allison P. Davis & Marcus Jones, Bo Derek Really Doesn't Want 
to Talk About Cornrows, CUT (July 16, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/07/bo-derek 
-doesnt-want-to-talk-about-cornrows.html [https://perma.cc/MD87-BH6H]. 
109. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
110. Axelrod, supra note 27. 
111. Brittany Willis, Never Forget #021: Black Women's Hair Was Once illegal, VISI-
BILITY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.thevisibilityproject.com/2016/02/03/never-for 
get-021-there-were-laws-that-banned-black-hair [https://perma.cc/URF7-4LTW]. 
112. Id. 
113. Seeid. 
114. Antonia Opiah, The Changing Business of Black Hair, a Potentially $500b Indus-
try, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/antonia-opiah 
/the-changing-business-of-_b_ 4650819 .html [https://perma.cc/ZH8S-ZLZ4]. 
115. Id. 
116. Cf. id. 
117. Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander & Linda F. Harrison, My Hair Is Not Like Yours: 
Workplace Hair Grooming Policies for African American Women As Racial Stereotyping 
in Violation of Title VII, 22 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 437, 438 (2016). 
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normative standards of appearance, specifically Eurocentric standards 
of beauty, they appear to be racially neutral when in fact they are 
race specific.118 When enforced, these policies exclude Black women's 
natural hairstyles--put differently, Black women who decide to wear 
their hair in its unaltered texture are excluded from the workplace. 119 
Thus, in order to be in compliance with these policies, Black women 
must alter the natural qualities of their hair or wear false hair. 120 
Famous Judge Mablean Ephriam, from Fox Network's Divorce 
Court, was fired after seven years, in part because she refused to wear 
a wig per the network's demand. 121 Unlike the plaintiff in Rogers, 
"Judge Mablean was willing to perm or straighten her hair."122 How-
ever, in season six, she had no choice but to wear a wig after suffer-
ing severe hair loss as a result of the chemical relaxing process. 123 
Additionally, the cost of chemical relaxers ranges from $60 to $300, or 
$40 to $400 for touch-ups between relaxers, which is usually required 
every six weeks.124 Again, the judiciary ignores Black women's unique 
struggles associated with the long, arduous, and relatively expensive 
process of styling one's hair to adhere to workplace grooming policies, 
that their White counterparts do not experience. 
Despite the courts having categorized both braids and dread-
locks as mutable characteristics, both hairstyles take to the natural 
texture of the person's hair, which is a biological element ofrace.125 
The Eleventh Circuit even conceded that black hair texture is an 
immutable characteristic, similar to skin color, but strangely reached 
the opposite conclusion regarding black hairstyles, noting that they 
are not because they can be changed.126 Prior to Rogers, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that businesses could refuse to hire men with long hair 
because hair length is a mutable characteristic not protected under 
Title VII. 127 Subsequent courts that followed this reasoning upheld 
employers' policies against braids, facial hair, and dreadlocks, essen-
tially making hair a permissible basis for employment decisions.128 
118. Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Sub-
jective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995). 
119. Bennett-Alexander & Harrison, supra note 117, at 438-39. 
120. Id. 
121. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis 
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1125 (2010). 
122. Id.; see also Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
123. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 121, at 1125. 
124. Id. at 1114. 
125. Gandy, supra note 19. 
126. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016). 
127. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975). 
128. AB. Wilkinson, No Dreadlocks Allowed, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2016), https:/lwww.the 
atlantic.comfbusiness/archive/2016/11/no-dreadlocks-allowed/506270 [https://perma.cc/8K 
HU-BG62] . 
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In a different case, not related to hair but culture, the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld an employer's "speak-only-English" policy after a plaintiff 
of Mexican descent sued his company for firing him for speaking in 
Spanish to a co-worker.129 He argued that the company's policy dis-
criminated on the basis of national origin, which was a protected 
characteristic under Title VII, but the court disagreed.130 The court 
reasoned that even though he was of Mexican descent, he chose to 
speak in Spanish and that choice qualified as a mutable cultural 
characteristic.131 Furthermore, the court, in explaining its decision, 
emphasized that "[n]ational origin'' was not to be confused with 
"ethnic or socio[-]cultural traits."132 Thus, CMS was able to win its 
case against Chastity Jones by relying on well-established legal pre-
cedent that Title VII does not protect the culture of the individuals 
it was created to protect. 133 
Operating under this same schema, discriminating against a 
person who speaks English with an accent, which is often associated 
with one's national origin, is not expressly prohibited under Title 
VII either.134 In fact, some employers have successfully used claims 
of "unintelligible English" to deny jobs to non-native speakers. 135 
However, in recent years, the amount oflitigation surrounding accent 
discrimination has skyrocketed and the EEOC has been able to 
reach some favorable settlements on behalf of their employees.136 
For example, in 2012, Delano Regional Medical Center in Califor-
nia's San Joaquin Valley settled for $975,000 in a national origin case 
involving a class of roughly seventy Filipino American hospital work-
ers.137 The plaintiffs alleged that the medical center's staff frequently 
harassed them, mocked their accents, and ordered them to speak in 
English at times when they already were.138 Supervisors, staff, and 
even volunteers at the hospital were encouraged to berate the workers, 
and the plaintiffs endured these types of comments for nearly six 
129. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,266 (5th Cir. 1980). 
130. Id. 
131. Wilkinson, supra note 128. 
132. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269. 
133. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32. 
134. See Beatrice Bich-Dao Nguyen, Accent Discrimination and the Test of Spoken 
English: A Call for an Objective Assessment of the Comprehensibility of Nonnative Speakers, 
1AsiANL.J.117, 122 (1994). 
135. Id. at 117. 
136. Melinda Koster, Accent Discrimination: An Overview, SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, 
LLP (Dec. 13, 2017), https://sanfordheisler.com/accent-discrimination [https://perma.cc 
/744C-9ZUV]. 
137. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Delano Regional Medical 
Center to Pay Nearly $1 Million in EEOC National Origin Discrimination Suit (Sept. 17, 
20 12), https:l/www l.eeoc.gov/leeoclnewsroom/release/9-17 -12a.cfm ?renderforprint= 1 
[https://perma.cciH59L-WKWB]. 
138. Id. 
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years. 139 According to the EEOC, some workers received threats of 
arrest if they did not speak English and were told to go back to the 
Philippines. 140 In one particularly egregious incident, "an employee 
sprayed air freshener on a claimant's lunch due to the offender's 
self-professed hatred of Filipino food."141 
In some cases, an employer can legally dismiss an employee if 
a fluency in English is required to perform the job and the employee 
cannot be understood within the context of the work environment 
and work assignments. 142 However, the courts take a "very search-
ing look" at an employer's reasons for using accent as a basis for 
terminating someone's employment. 143 The most common example 
of an employer legally being able to fire an employee for their accent 
is in a customer service or telemarketing job, where it is helpful that 
customers understand the employee. 144 
The bottom line is that it is not always illegal for an employer "to 
render a decision based on an individual's accent."145 In court, all the 
employer would need to prove is that effective spoken communication 
in English is necessary for the employee to perform his or her job 
duties and the person's accent materially interferes with his or her 
ability to communicate orally in English.146 In such cases, courts must 
make a determination about the individual's comprehensibility, which 
is a process that is riddled with subjectivity and bias.147 
B. "Accident of Birth" 
The Supreme Court has suggested that the identification of an 
immutable characteristic can support suspect class status and warrant 
heightened scrutiny .148 When the Supreme Court has found that the 
trait at issue is not immutable, it has declined to apply heightened 
scrutiny. 149 
InFrontiero v. Richardson, the Court defined an immutable char-
acteristic as "an accident of birth."150 In Plyler v. Doe, it declined to 
grant suspect class status to undocumented students because the law 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Understanding Workplace Discrimination, LEGALMATCH, https:/lwww.legal.match 
.comfl.aw-library/article/accent-discrimination-lawyers.html [https:/!permacdUQT7-H32Y] 
[hereinafter Workplace Discrimination]. 
143. Koster, supra note 136. 
144. Workplace Discrimination, supra note 142. 
145. Koster, supra note 136. 
146. Workplace Discrimination, supra note 142. 
147. See Nguyen, supra note 134, at 117. 
148. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1510. 
149. Id. 
150. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
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views entry into that class as voluntary, and immutable characteris-
tics are not products of"conscious ... action."161 In previous cases, the 
Court has determined that a group is a suspect class when it bears 
"traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process."152 Nevertheless, in Plyler, the Court recognized the special 
disabilities Congress imposed on undocumented persons for violating 
federal law, but found that the state's differential treatment of aliens 
is consistent with its interest in enforcing its immigration policy.153 
Finding that undocumented immigrants were not a suspect class, the 
Court applied rational basis analysis to ultimately strike down the 
statute denying undocumented students access to free public school 
education, as the Court saw no real difference between a lawful 
resident and an undocumented person receiving public education. 154 
Today, in the employment context, Section 1324(1)(b) of the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act makes it illegal for employers to 
discriminate based on citizenship or immigration status. 155 In the 
United States, a person's citizenship is immutable until they become 
eligible for naturalization, suggesting that citizenship is not abso-
lutely unchangeable.156 On the other hand, for some, citizenship can 
be considered "an accident by birth," specifically those who automat-
ically become citizens by virtue ofbeing born in the United States.157 
Either way, one's citizenship status does not comfortably fit within 
the concept of immutability that seems to govern federal antidis-
crimination statutes. 168 
Some might consider one's political affiliation "as personally de-
fining as [one's] religion."159 However, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court 
decided that political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, 
as it "may shift from one election to the next."160 Nevertheless, the 
immutability requirement does little to explain why some traits are 
protected by Title VII, w bile others are not. 161 
151. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
152. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
153. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
154. See id. at 230; see also Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1510. 
155. See Immigration Refonn and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l)(B) (2006). 
156. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1508. 
157. Id. at 1516. 
158. Seeid. 
159. Id. at 1536. 
160. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004). 
161. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1521. 
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Many characteristics can be described as "accidents ofbirth," but 
"they do not enjoy protected status."162 For example, there are no 
employment discrimination statutes that address height, eye color, 
or handedness.163 Therefore, it is clear that not all immutable char-
acteristics are or should be the subject of Title VII. 164 In fact, there 
are many immutable traits that are excluded from statutory protec-
tion presumably ''because employers are unlikely to care about them 
or ... make adverse decisions based on them."165 Thus, it may be un-
reasonable for the legislature to intervene and add these traits to the 
law when the "probability of bias based on these [characteristics] is 
very low."166 
It is also important to highlight that Vieth is the only case after 
1986 in which the Supreme Court discusses immutability, suggesting 
that its application is no longer necessary and potentially irrelevant 
to the equal protection analysis altogether.167 Thus, the immutabil-
ity requirement may need to be abandoned in light of our society's 
ever-evolving understanding of race, sex, and other identities pro-
tected under Title VII. 
C. "Fundamental to the Identity" 
In addition to adopting the Supreme Court's "accident by birth" 
interpretation of immutability, the lower courts also find a trait to be 
immutable when it is "so fundamental to the identities or consciences 
of its members that members either cannot or should not be required 
to change it."168 Under this test, the trait does not have to be entirely 
fixed in order for it to be considered immutable-overcoming the 
hurdle presented by the "accident of birth'' standard. 169 
Traits "so fundamental to the identity" are thought to be a part 
of one's self-concept, which is comprised of a mixture of "cultural, 
familial, historical, and internal factors."17° For example, although 
religion is one of the protected classes under Title VII, it is techni-
cally mutable, given that an individual has the ability to convert to 
a different faith.171 However, some would argue that one's religious 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1522--23. 
164. Id. at 1523. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1523. 
167. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 
647-48 (2001). 
168. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1512 (citation omitted). 
169. Id. 
170. Marcosson, supra note 167, at 682--83. 
171. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1508. 
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beliefs are nevertheless fundamental to one's world-view and iden-
tity.I72 
This standard would also apply to individuals who acquire un-
alterable disabilities through accidents or other misfortunes after 
birth.173 For example, some members ofthe deaf community decline 
to wear cochlear implants because they view their disability as a 
fundamental component of their identity.174 Although a separate 
law, the ADAAA would apply to this type of situation; the spirit of the 
statute honors the personal choice of an individual, who chooses to 
remain deaf, and finds penalizing that choice to be unacceptable. 175 
D. Race as a Social Construct 
Under the Supreme Court's "accident of birth" interpretation, 
Chastity Jones's claim might have survived based on the Eleventh 
Circuit's concession that black hair texture is an immutable trait as 
it is a biological element ofrace.176 However, race can be illusory when 
understood as an entirely biological construct. 177 One scholar defines 
race as a "group of people loosely bound together by historically contin-
gent, socially significant elements of their morphology and/or ances-
try ."178 Based on this view, race is determined by heredity and subject 
to chance.179 But as the EEOC argued in EEOC v. Catastrophe Man-
agement Solutions, one's race is not defined or limited by biological 
characteristics.180 In fact, the scientific community would generally 
agree that "race is a social construct without biological meaning."181 
Some geneticists believe that while race can serve as a useful tool 
to study human genetic diversity, it is an imprecise proxy for the 
relationship between ancestry and genetics-making it a poorly 
defined marker to measure that diversity .182 For example, in one 
study where genomes from Mrica and Europe were compared, there 
was "no single variant'' between the two continents. 183 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 1518. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1519. 
176. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
177. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 61 (1994). 
178. Id. at 40. 
179. Id. 
180. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022. 
181. Megan Gannon, Race is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https:/lwww.scientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue 
[https://perma.cc/6G39-TURQ]. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
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The EEOC also alleged race" 'encompasses cultural characteris-
tics related to race or ethnicity,' including 'grooming practices'" when 
citing its Compliance Manual, but astoundingly the federal courts 
are not bound by the EEOC's manual, nor by its interpretations of 
its own regulations, which the EEOC is responsible for enforcing. 184 
Certainly, there are some challenges posed by asking the courts 
to include culture within the meaning of race. 185 First, the courts 
would have to choose among competing definitions of race. 186 Second, 
the courts must decide which cultural practices are associated with 
a particular race. 187 And third, the courts would have to justify why 
some cultural characteristics and practices are included as a part of 
race and explain why others are excluded from Title VII protection.188 
With respect to racial classifications, the Supreme Court has 
said, "[c]lear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which 
have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criti-
cized as having little biological significance."189 
In Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities, the court was 
faced with the challenge of defining race in an employment discrimi-
nation suit, alleging disparate treatment in the workplace, due to the 
plaintiffs status as an American Indian.190 And although the plain-
tiffs claim alleged discrimination on the basis of national origin, the 
court largely focused on racial discrimination, and discussed how 
perception plays a major role in determining who is a member of a 
minority group for purposes of Title VII. 191 
In this case, the employer filed two motions for summary judg-
ment, that he was not an American Indian, therefore he was not a 
member of a protected class covered by the statute and could not make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination.192 Thus, the question before 
the court was whether the plaintiff was in fact American Indian.193 
The court admitted that there was no straightforward answer 
when it comes to determining one's racial classification; it is "decep-
tively complex."194 The court described the amorphous nature of the 
184. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022. 
185. Jon Hyman, Dreadlocks and Race Decision By 11th Circuit Asks Big Questions 
on Meaning of Bias, WORKFORCE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.workforce.com/2016/09/19 
/dreadlocks-race-decision-11th-circuit-asks-big-questions-meaning-bias [https://perma.cc 
/N67E-VHYP] . 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Saint Francis Coil. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987). 
190. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep't. ofUtils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
191. Id. at 1273. 
192. Id. at 1264. 
193. Id. at 1265. 
194. Id. at 1271. 
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term "race" and explained how "[t]he traditional racial categoriza-
tions of Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid have been narrowed, 
expanded, and/or reconfigured by various social scientists and other 
disciplines over the years to the point that the very notion of 'race' 
may be deemed illusory."195 The court then considered the history of 
racial classification in America, namely the "one-drop rule," when 
race was decided by a person's blood and anyone with a single drop 
of "black blood," or ancestor of Mrican descent, was considered 
Black.196 Quite oppositely, the "Pocahontas exception" made allow-
ances for Whites who claimed Native American ancestry, allowing 
up to one-sixteenth of Native American blood.197 However, "[a]s early 
as 1934 the United States Supreme Court recognized that there was 
no strict formula for determining racial class."198 In fact, the Supreme 
Court's approach to determining racial classes proves to be drasti-
cally inconsistent with how the lower courts have treated race in 
earlier employment discrimination cases. 199 
The particular difficulty of categorizing individuals into racial 
categories for purposes of Title VII is that the statute distinguishes 
between national origin and race, when in cases of racial discrimina-
tion, that distinction is often unclear and based on the employer's 
perception of that individual. 200 To explain this, the court cited the 
Code of Federal Regulations's definition of national origin discrimi-
nation, which provides in part: "[t]he Commission defines national 
origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the 
denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, 
or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has 
the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national ori-
gin group."201 
195. Id. (citation omitted). 
196. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1271 (quoting Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW 
YORKER (July 25, 1994)), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/07/25/one-drop-of 
-blood [https://perma.cd39W6-J9TL]. 
197. An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/lewisandclark 
/studentslprojects/monacans/Contemporary_Monacanslracial.html [https:l/perma.cci7UB4 
-PLGM]. 
198. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1272. 
199. Compare Saint. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,610 n.4 (1987) (finding 
that racial classifications are for the most part "sociopolitical, rather than biological, in na-
ture") with Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that 
"[a]n all-braided hair style is 'an easily changed characteristic,' and, even ifsocioculturally 
associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinc-
tions in the application of employment practices by an employer [under Title VII]j (citation 
omitted), and Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that Title VII 
is directed only at discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion or national origin and 
does not apply to ethnic or socio-cultural traits). 
200. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1272. 
201. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2018). 
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The court concluded by emphasizing that the purpose of Title 
VII is to equalize the position of all employees and suggested that 
the standard of proof, for plaintiffs to demonstrate their membership 
to a protected class, should be lower.202 
In Ham v. South Carolina, Justice Douglas conveyed in his dis-
senting opinion the idea that "individuals ... flaunt social conven-
tions about gender, race, and status through both action and physical 
appearance."203 In a case about a potential juror's prejudice towards 
people who wear beards, Justice Douglas discussed how unconven-
tional hair growth is symbolic to rebellion against traditional society 
and "disapproval of the way the current power structure handles 
social problems''-presumably in reference to the Hippie Movement 
during the 1960s.204 He went on further to say that taken as a 
statement of one's commitment to social reform, unconventional hair 
growth may be seen as a threat to those who support the status quo. 205 
And as Justice Douglas's comments are insightful, they are pre-
scient of future litigation arising from workplace grooming policies 
and systemic intolerance of Black women's hair.206 
In recent years, "natural hair has become a politicized trend."207 
But as one naturalista208 puts it, "I'm not trying to make a state-
ment by being myself."209 Some girls have even faced punishment at 
school because of their hair. 210 At a charter school in Massachusetts, 
two Black female students were kicked off their sports teams and 
prohibited from attending their school prom because they wore their 
hair in braids. 211 
202. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276. 
203. Deborah Pergament, It's Not Just Hair: Historical and Cultural Considerations 
for an Emerging Technology, 75 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 41, 41 (1999--2000); see Ham v. South 
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The rationale behind the policy was to "serve a 'diverse student 
population' that fosters 'a culture that emphasizes education rather 
than style, fashion or materialism.' "212 Furthermore, the school be-
lieved its policy against hair extensions was in line with its educa-
tional mission because of their alleged high cost.213 In reality, the 
school's dress code accomplished the exact opposite. First, enforce-
ment of this hair policy resulted in the singling out of several Black 
students whose studies and activities were presumably interrupted 
to have their hair inspected. 214 Second, it seemed that the school was 
unaware of how textured hair grows in comparison to straight hair, 
as the former grows up and the latter grows down, thus any Black 
student's hair (as it grows naturally), per se, exceeded the height limit 
imposed by the dress code. 215 Third, the school was clearly misin-
formed about the relative inexpensiveness ofbraiding hair (hair used 
for cornrows and braids).216 Generally, people who wear braids use 
Kanekalon jumbo braid hair, which costs $2.99 per pack, and that 
is on the pricier end of the spectrum.217 Thus, the school was not 
eradicating any socioeconomic differences, as a package of braiding 
hair would cost about the same as a package of Goody hair ties.218 
In the professional setting, the unfairness of these grooming 
policies stems from the fact that White women are able to wear their 
hair in its natural state, whereas Black women are oftentimes criti-
cized, or in some cases fired, for doing the same.219 
For some Black women, hair is inextricably tied to identity. 220 
Especially in a society that adheres to Eurocentric standards of 
beauty, hair, like skin color, can be a determinant of a positive black 
self-image or a "politically 'healthy' state of black subjectivity."221 
212. Id. (citation omitted). 
213. Id. 
214. See id. 
215. Id.; see also Madison Moore, Black Hair Problems, THOUGHT CATALOG (Oct. 15, 
20 12), https://thoughtcatalog.comlmadison-moore/20 12/10/black-hair-problemsl [https:/1 
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The internalization of white beauty standards begins as early as 
childhood, when young Black girls are constantly bombarded with 
messages from the media, their peers, and society about what beauty 
is. 222 Furthermore, upon realizing that they will never fit society's 
racial definition ofbeauty, self-acceptance can become increasingly 
difficult, and result in negative self-perception and a culture of self-
hatred. 223 A historical example of this phenomenon is the famous 
Clark "doll experiment," first conducted in 1939 by social psycholo-
gists Kenneth and Mamie Clark, which was designed to illustrate 
internalized attitudes about race, and the effect of segregation on 
Black children. 224 
The participants were shown four dolls and asked to identify 
the race of the dolls and which color doll they preferred.225 Most 
children chose the white doll and assigned positive attributes to it, 
while rejecting the black doll and labeling it as the ''bad" doll.226 
Finally, when asked to choose the doll that looked most like the child, 
some participants became so upset after being forced to identify 
with the "bad'' doll that they stormed out of the room.227 From this, 
the Clarks concluded that "color in a racist society was a very dis-
turbing and traumatic component of an individual's sense of his own 
self-esteem and worth."228 
llitimately, the Clarks' research proved to be so powerful that 
the U.S. Supreme Court cited the doll experiment as one of the key 
factors in its decision of Brown v. Board of Education, because of the 
demonstrated psychological and emotional harm caused by segrega-
tion. 229 In the Court's unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
wrote that the legal separation of Black children generated "a feeling 
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."230 
Since Brown, the Clark doll experiment is still being used to as-
sess children's attitudes about race, but instead of the question asking 
222. Mrica Jackson, How Do We Teach Young Girls of Color Self-Esteem?, ESTABLISH-
MENT (July 5, 2016), https://theestablishment.colhow-do-we-teach-young-girls-of-color 
-self-esteem-dl33d862cl60 [https://perma.cdGQ23-YKP8]. 
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227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954). 
230. Id. at 494. 
214 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 25:191 
which doll is "good" or "bad," the participant is asked which doll is 
"pretty'' versus "ugly''-precisely to test the effects of white beauty 
standards on Black children. 231 Sixty years later, the research still 
yields the same results: that antiblack racism is internalized at a 
young age.232 
Similar research has been done on the effects of white beauty 
standards on the life trajectories of Black women, specifically, the im-
pact internalization has on self-image, academic success, socialization, 
and employment.233 The family is often the earliest and biggest in-
fluence in a child's life, and has a major role in the child's emotional, 
social, and cognitive development. 234 Among Black Americans, skin 
color prejudice, also known as "colorism," is a widespread problem 
that is perpetuated by those both inside and outside the community. 236 
In 2001, researchers found that people's attitudes about their own 
skin color corresponded with the skin color most idealized by their 
family members.236 They found that lighter skin coincided with higher 
levels of cultural pride, whereas people with darker complexions re-
ported lower self-esteem. 237 Cultural standards of beauty and attrac-
tiveness also play a significant role in one's academic achievement.238 
Studies found that young Black girls whose hair and skin color was 
the most unlike their White classmates, were often alienated at school 
and in other social settings. 239 This social isolation resulted in lower 
levels of academic achievement among darker-skinned Black girls, 
which led to higher dropout rates in high school and limited employ-
ment opportunities as adults, further demonstrating how white stan-
dards of beauty alone can impact the life trajectory of Black women.240 
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illtimately, race is a social construct with perceivable conse-
quences.241 And although hair is a biological occurrence, it too has 
"social and political meanings."242 For these reasons, the judiciary's 
concept of immutability with respect to race is incompatible with 
society's existing understanding of race, and therefore, should be 
abandoned. 
III. FINDING PRECEDENT TO EXTEND TITLE VII 
PROTECTION TO ETHNIC HAIRSTYLES 
Despite the prevalence of hair grooming policies by employers, 
the courts have been unwilling to find a constitutional basis for the 
argument that hairstyles should be protected by Title VII.243 With 
respect to constitutional challenges, in Kelley v. Johnson, a police 
officer challenged a county regulation that limited the length of male 
police officers' hair.244 Based on a rational basis analysis, in that 
case, the Supreme Court held that the regulation did not violate any 
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.245 The majority 
noted that law enforcement officers were subject to regulations re-
quiring specific dress and behavior while members of the general 
public were not.246 Furthermore, the majority noted that the Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest in personal grooming is limited 
by the state's police power, thus the county's interest in an easily 
recognizable, uniform police force, outweighed the plaintiff's right 
to wear his hair as he wished. 247 
Similarly, the majority of courts have found that hair-length 
requirements that "do not cause disparate treatment [between] male 
and female employees" are not impermissible under Title VII. 248 For 
example, in Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit held that sex-differentiated grooming standards, as 
applied to male bus drivers, did not constitute sex discrimination 
under Title VII.249 The court reasoned that discrimination must be 
based on immutable characteristics or protected characteristics, not 
mere personal preference. 250 
In claims of racial discrimination, "courts have also been unwill-
ing to find a constitutional basis for the claim that hairstyles are 
241. Id. at 70. 
242. Pergament, supra note 203, at 52. 
243. Id. 
244. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1976). 
245. Id. at 249. 
246. See id. at 245. 
247. Id. 
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250. Id. at 1351. 
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immutable and should enjoy constitutional protection" (i.e. be pro-
tected by Title VII). 251 However, the immutability requirement has not 
been "uniformly applied in cases where an immutable characteristic 
adversely [a]ffects an individual's ability to comply with a grooming 
requirement."252 In Bradley v. Pizzaco, a Black plaintiff successfully 
argued that a policy banning beards disparately impacted Black 
men due to their susceptibility to pseudofolliculitis (PFB). 253 He 
argued that because the condition occurs in fifty percent of Black 
men in comparison to only one percent of White men, enforcing the 
policy was disparate impact race discrimination. 254 Furthermore, 
because the plaintiff was a pizza delivery man, the no-beard policy 
was neither directly related nor necessary to the job. 255 Conceivably, 
a no-beard policy in other professions may be reasonable. For exam-
ple, firefighters who must wear respirators, and in order for the mask 
to operate properly and safely, its edges must be able to seal securely 
to the wearer's face.256 In Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, the city made 
this very argument and was able to defend its no-beard policy for 
firefighters as a business necessity.257 
Nevertheless, like the plaintiff in Bradley, Chastity Jones could 
similarly argue that CMS's policy against dreadlocks is disparate 
impact race discrimination, as the hairstyle is consistent with the 
immutable trait of hair texture, and the policy is not job-related or a 
business necessity. 258 To prevail on a disparate impact claim, she would 
have to demonstrate how the grooming policy has "an actual, ... not 
necessarily deliberate, adverse impact on [a] protected group[]," in 
this case, Black people.259 
Here, the chances that an individual other than a Black person 
would have dreadlocks-albeit the occasional White Rastafarian-
are presumably low considering the high prevalence of the hairstyle 
251. See Pergament, supra note 203, at 55. 
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in the Black community.260 Furthermore, Jones was initially hired for 
a call center position and it is unclear how dreadlocks would impede 
on her ability to perform her job, or interfere with CMS's business 
interests, given she would be presumably interacting with customers 
through telephone communications only.261 By enforcing this policy, 
CMS is effectively forcing Jones to cut off all her hair, as that is the 
only way to "undo" dreadlocks, and be bald or wear a wig until her 
hair grows back, assuming that her natural hair will not be considered 
"excessive" or "unusual."262 Furthermore, assuming that CMS's policy 
generally follows societal standards of appearance, requiring Jones 
to change her hair would impose undue burdens that are not gener-
ally expected of White women, whose hair is considered the norm. 263 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed earlier, Title VII "can be expanded to reach injus-
tices not contemplated in 1964."264 For example, when Congress passed 
Title VII, it did not view gender stereotyping to be sex discrimina-
tion.265 It was not until .Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in 1989, when the 
Supreme Court expanded Title VII to include gender stereotyping.266 
Likewise, Congress did not initially consider sexual harassment ac-
tionable under Title VII untilMeritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, when 
the Court held that a claim of "hostile work environment" sexual 
harassment was a form of sex discrimination.267 Yet, surprisingly, 
there is currently no federal law prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.268 
The lower courts are split on the issue ofLGBT employees who 
experience sexual harassment related to their sexual orientation.269 
Some courts have ruled that these types of comments represent dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which is not covered 
under federal law, whereas other courts have ruled that these types 
of comments stem from gender stereotypes, which are recognized as 
a form of sex discrimination prohibited by law. 270 Additionally, there 
260. See CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022. 
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are several federal court decisions supporting the protection of trans-
gender individuals in cases involving sex discrimination. 271 Most 
recently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the 
employer on plaintiffs claim that she was terminated from her job 
as an automechanic because she was transgender.272 The court 
remanded the case for trial because there was sufficient evidence to 
create a triable issue of fact as to whether gender bias was a moti-
vating factor for the plaintiffs termination.273 Likewise, in Smith v. 
City of Salem, the plaintiff alleged that he was suspended based on 
sex, because he began to express a more feminine appearance and 
advised his employer of his intention of undergoing a complete physi-
cal transformation from male to female. 274 In that case, the Sixth 
Circuit held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against trans-
gender individuals based on gender stereotyping.275 The court rea-
soned that the "narrow view" of the term "sex," in prior case law 
denying transgender individuals statutory protection, was no longer 
valid in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Price.276 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia, one of the most celebrated originalists in Supreme 
Court history, noted in the majority opinion that, while same-sex 
harassment was "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was con-
cerned with when it enacted Title VII": 
[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they 
were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and 
it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the princi-
pal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title 
VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' .... [This] 
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirements. 277 
CONCLUSION 
Surely, Justice Scalia's logic would similarly apply to hair dis-
crimination against Black women. 278 And although Congress may 
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not have drafted Title VII with plaintiffs like Chastity Jones in mind, 
that does not mean that the courts cannot interpret the law to strike 
down racially discriminatory grooming policies. 279 
It is bizarre that the Eleventh Circuit found itself bound by the 
definition of race at the time Title VII was enacted, when in recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected narrow interpreta-
tions of national origin and sex. 280 The EEOC has even provided 
guidance in the form of its Compliance Manual, that although not 
binding on the courts, it is indeed helpful to resolving the issue of 
what constitutes race.281 
While the issue of hair may seem trivial to some, for Black 
women it is consequential, as choosing to wear one's hair naturally 
can end up being a career liability. Being a Black woman in a space 
where standards of professionalism reinforce social hierarchies that 
privilege whiteness is having to be constantly aware of how you fit 
in and daily having to battle others' preconceptions about your 
capabilities based on pervasive stereotypes about Black women 
generally. To target black hairstyles in workplace grooming policies 
is to correlate black culture with unprofessionalism and force Black 
women to adopt more palatable alternatives in order to maintain 
employment. And although employers have the right to enforce 
dress codes, the practice of banning dreadlocks, braids, or any other 
quintessentially black hairstyle, is unquestionably racist as there is 
no existing evidence that these hairstyles run counter to the image 
of a professional workplace. 
Thus, in order to effectively combat racial discrimination in the 
workplace, the courts must expand the margins of race for purposes of 
Title VII to encompass traits beyond immutable characteristics, by 
eliminating the immutability requirement altogether or at least apply-
ing it less stringently to include cultural aspects associated with race. 
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